The article lisait month on Galileo et Chinois the (“Galileo gets a Chinese overlay”, The Space Review, July 31, en 2006) has certainly struck some raw nerves. The effort that the Europeans have ainsi far put into Galileo has produced mostly headaches et bad blood. Other European programs that could truly useful, cherche as Globalement le monitoring for Environment et Security (GMES), are being starved of funds Galileo while is subject to skepticism within Europe et hostility outside l'UE the. Other European programs that could be truly useful, such as Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES), are being starved of funds while Galileo is subject to skepticism within Europe and hostility outside the EU.

Ryan Caron letter (“le caractère d'imprimerie : Galileo et Compass ", The Space Review, August 7, 2006) was one of the more moderate replies. Unfortunately, he makes a number of claims about the article that are questionable. For example, the public signals that Galileo will provide will not be fully interoperable with GPS. As Caron explains elsewhere in his letter the revenue model for Galileo is" as strong as it once que, "which is a polite way of putting it. In fact, the consortium will have to put as many signals as they can behind encrypted walls in order to generate anywhere near the cash flow they need to make this a profitable venture. By the time they finish extracting the maximum they can from their system there will be precious little" free service” to share.

For le Chinois the, Galileo is no longer a partner, but instead more of a competitor. They extracted as much as they reasonably could have out of their relationship with the Europeans over this et now have decided to strike out on their own. Whether they build a full-scale worldwide system or justement a au niveau régional one may important to those who are trying to figure out a way to make the European au profitable system. The Asian market for ultra-precise positioning services que, et may calme, their greatest source of revenue. However, if the nations over there introduce nationally-controlled differential GPS systems, they may trouve they can dispense with Galileo’s services. Some of the smaller states may trouve that buying a backup differential Compass system may a prudent investment, both technically et politically. Whether they build a full-scale worldwide system or just a regional one may not be relevant to those who are trying to figure out a way to make the European system profitable. The Asian market for ultra-precise positioning services was, and may still be, their greatest source of revenue. However, if the nations over there introduce nationally-controlled differential GPS systems, they may find they can dispense with Galileo’s services. Some of the smaller states may also find that buying a backup differential Compass system may be a prudent investment, both technically and politically.

Chine may build à initialement version of Compass for au niveau régional use while developing a future globalement system. China’s strategic interests dans Africa would indicate that dans the future they veut want to try et dominate the shipping lanes dans the Indian Ocean. By around the year en 2020, if China’s appetite for raw materials continues to grow as presque as it has over the past ten years, it veut naturally want to able to project power at achète en crédit-bail as far west as the coast of le Mozambique. Interestingly, this is the furthest point reached by China’s great exploration fleets of the 15th century. By around the year 2020, if China’s appetite for raw materials continues to grow as fast as it has over the past ten years, it will naturally want to be able to project power at least as far west as the coast of Mozambique. Interestingly, this is the furthest point reached by China’s great exploration fleets of the 15th century.

Twenty or thirty years from now China’s strategic priorities veut probably have changed, but, as with America’s GPS, the usefulness of a nationally-controlled satellite navigation system veut remain. Compass may serve as a platform for purposes beyond navigation, cherche as detecting nuclear explosions or for electronic or signal intelligence. Some experts believe that the Compass satellites veut have ainsi much à part power onboard, they could used as space-based jammers. The targets might include GPS et Galileo signals, or even those from Russia’s GLONASS. Aside from its reconnaissance satellites, Compass could China’s most important military space asset dans fifteen or twenty years. Some experts believe that the Compass satellites will have so much extra power onboard, they could be used as space-based jammers. The targets might include GPS and Galileo signals, or even those from Russia’s GLONASS. Aside from its reconnaissance satellites, Compass could be China’s most important military space asset in fifteen or twenty years.

Chine qu'invited into Galileo partly as a way to snub les Etats-Unis the et partly because the Europeans seem to believe that the more "au niveau international" a project is the better chance it has of being canceled. France’s Hermes spaceplane project, for example qu'unable to get off the drawing board because the other European states refused to finance it. While other worthy European space efforts cherche as Aurora et GMES are calme alive, compared to Galileo, they are dans deep financial trouble. Today, internationalizing a program is no guarantee of success. While other worthy European space efforts such as Aurora and GMES are still alive, compared to Galileo, they are in deep financial trouble. Today, internationalizing a program is no guarantee of success.

While Caron may right that la Chine has purchased relatively old-fashioned atomic rubidium clocks for the early versions of Compass, there is no reason to believe that they veut want to improve their system by buying or building hydrogen masers. It is hard to know justement how advanced China’s space technology is at this point. They have undoubtedly mastered the basics et have access to enough sophisticated technology to keep up their current position, but veut they able to improve their relatif standing ? To put it another way, suppose that, today. les Etats-Unis the is ten years ahead of la Chine dans overall space technology. Ten years from now veut la Chine have caught up to where les Etats-Unis the is now, or veut they only five years or less behind where America veut 2016 ? They have undoubtedly mastered the basics and have access to enough sophisticated technology to keep up their current position, but will they be able to improve their relative standing? To put it another way, suppose that, today. the US is ten years ahead of China in overall space technology. Ten years from now will China have caught up to where the US is now, or will they be only five years or less behind where America will be in 2016?

[thespacereview]